Epistemology of religious belief and its morals

Author's name: Al-Mahdi Mustaqim Publisher: Istifham Publishing Year of publication: 2024 Literary classification: Philosophy and Thought Brief about the book: The observers of religious beliefs among contemporary philosophers are divided into two groups: A team of "William Clifford" and "Bertrand Russell": which is the team of evidentialist philosophers who decided to base their philosophical tendency on two matters: A — No belief without sufficient evidence; B — The criterion of belief is based on truth. A team of "William James" and "Wittgenstein": which is the team of non-evidentialist philosophers who decided to base their philosophical tendency on two matters: A — No need for belief in argumentative and evidential processes; B — The criterion of belief is based on practical reasons. This has led to the emergence of three main orientations: A position of affirmation aiming to establish religious beliefs through epistemic-ethical considerations: religious beliefs are valid. Therefore, a person has the right to hold himself to believe; A negation position aiming to invalidate religious beliefs through epistemic-ethical considerations: religious beliefs are false and baseless. Therefore, a person has the right to refrain from believing; A stance of suspension refrains from issuing judgment regarding religious beliefs: suspension of judgment. There is no doubt that the essence of belief is truth, as there is an internal link that unites both; and we mean the existence of a thread that organizes the concepts: belief, truth, and justification. Therefore, any attempt to separate them may lead to losing their meaning. Hence, the ethics of belief and the ethics of research and inquiry are based on the obligation to adhere to standards of a purely epistemic nature, which requires understanding the normative dimension of the central concepts upon which the process of philosophical research and inquiry is built; and we mean the concepts: "belief," "truth," and "justification," as well as the concept of "value." Thus, it can be said that philosophy contains contents that take the form of beliefs, propositions, and expressions that can be true or false. However, the people who talk about ethics today neglect the existence of ethics for belief and ethics for knowledge, whose function is to formulate specific cognitive values and evaluate them. Is it permissible for a person to hold himself to believe? Is it permissible for a person to hold himself to refrain from believing? Two questions whose posing transforms the epistemology of belief into a kind of ethics of belief. It is worth noting that the latter does not concern examining the characteristics and features of belief as epistemology does, but rather focuses on examining behaviors, conduct, patterns of work and action, habits, vices, and virtues.