Delos the noise of existence

28.98

Product description

Author's name: Alain Badiou Publisher: Al-Jamal Publications for Publishing and Distribution Year of publication: 2018 Literary classification: Philosophy and Thought Brief about the book: What is education actually? We know that it is always a central question of philosophy. And we also know that it relates to linking the answer to another question: what about being? And we know, thirdly, since Parmenides, that whatever the conceptual treatment of that link or the answer given to the question of being, it must end in the possible formulas for one issue: "The I is the I is at the same time, thought and being, the great arrow of Heidegger lies in that he redefined, with intense condensation, the formulation of those commands as the ones that determine the practice of philosophy. And every creative philosophical work today, like the work of Gilles Deleuze, adheres in the context of the conditions of the era to three questions: what about being? what about thought? how does Deleuze realize, as one, an unorganised, illusory, meaningless idea of meaning, hypothetically, a pure permanence, addition, proof of agreement, and an eternal return? And that thought is a dividing line, intuition, a roll of the dice, a gloomy aesthetic domination, and the power of memory. It remains to deepen more into the theory of connection regarding what meaning aligns thought and being, and according to what use of the coincidence? Because the logical coincidence, A = A, is rejected by Deleuze, as it is a proposition from the Platonic propositions. There is a longstanding tradition that equates thought and being as a principle. In Aristotle's "Metaphysics" Book Gamma, he deals with the possibility of thinking about being as being according to the trilogy of the principle of coincidence, the principle of non-contradiction, and the third principle. But Deleuze's conviction is that we can no longer follow this path. And this is not a matter of good will: we can no longer do that. Because the thought that "connects" within principles, the being of being and the being of thought, is actually enjoyable for us in terms of positioning the world (that is, in terms of being itself, in its contemporary state or Simo Lacroix's). Nietzsche and his followers have once again revealed the idea — a world from which a roll of the dice emanates. But, at their level, it is a world without principle, a world that has lost all principles ("The Fold," p. 90). Should we conclude from this an inevitable separation between being and thought? No, without a doubt. How will this separation be undertaken by the most radical thinker since Bergson? Deleuze tells us that it is necessary to praise Foucault for his detailed analyses, stating that "knowledge is being" (Foucault, p. 119). Therefore, the problem is an issue of an unprincipled coincidence between thought and being. We can rely here on a great tradition rooted in Descartes, which questions being-thought within a self-related problematic. This tradition, at least apparently, does not require returning to fundamental principles, because the link is achieved by borrowing a self, bearer of thought, and questioning this self in terms of its existence. Being of thought is recognized as the being of the self, and the question of the coincidence of being and thought turns into a question about the status of the being-self within being. The peak of this approach is undoubtedly Hegel, when he sets a program for philosophy as a whole: to think the absolute not only as an essence but also, at the same time, as a self. Deleuze cannot follow this path either, at least directly. And to oppose Deleuze's fundamental opposition to all that is presented as "philosophy" in the self, many intersecting reasons... There was only an ontological issue: being is complicit. There was only one ontology, that of Duns Scotus, which gives voice to the complicit being. We say Duns Scotus because he knew how to carry the complicit being to the height of delicacy, with the possibility that this might be indicated through abstraction. But from Parmenides to Heidegger, the same voice is what repeats, forming the entire extent of the complicit being — a single voice composing the noise of being [...]. It can be said that Deleuze's era in philosophy was marked and characterized by the return of the question of being. And therefore, Heidegger dominated it, as he conducted the diagnosis, and after a century of critique and then the phenomenological break, he explicitly engaged with what he had reorganized as the original thinking: what about the being of entities?" Ultimately, the 20th century was ontological, and this fateful designation is more essential than the "linguistic fluctuation" that is often attributed to it. In this sense, Deleuze is the most faithful of the century, for it would not be possible to link his thinking to the linguistic fluctuation, which appears as grammatical or logical reductions, nor to the phenomenological trend that he sharply criticizes for reducing living wishes to mere forms of intentional connection of consciousness. The question Deleuze raises is about being, and these essays contained in this book are attempts to answer that question, as all his writings are, under the compulsion of countless cases where agreement occurs, to think about thinking (in the act of thinking in its movement) based on an ontological understanding of being as one. And one can never emphasize enough that the critical or phenomenological interpretation of his works continually obscures and conceals that Deleuze explicitly equates philosophy and ontology. Publisher's note: There is no doubt that it is not about coincidence or even intersection, but about a confrontational opposition, but it can conceptually be carried on the shared conviction regarding what can be conditioned today for philosophy, and regarding the central problem it must address: I mean the problem of a thought that is contemporaneous with multiplicity. It is judged that Deleuze, in seeking to understand all components of his era and organizing his thinking in the pattern of capturing the surface of the reflecting event, and subjecting his enchanting writing to the requirements of access to areas of differing meaning, is in conflict with the virtue he carried in Leibniz in the classical era, the inventor of the contemporary baroque, where our desire for multiplicity, hybridization, and the co-existence of worlds without a common ground is reflected and expanded, and overall, our tendency towards a universal democracy.

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