Second statement for philosophy

The fundamental premise that moves Badiou's thinking in this book is this: "Every being is capable of producing its truth within itself." It is a production doomed to "appear," that is, to exist or be there in a certain world. Therefore, the pattern of the appearance of truths is "singular" or "in the singular," and then it "weaves" self-operations that go beyond the liberal claim that there are only "bodies" and "languages" to the sincere acknowledgment of oneself that there are also "exceptional" truths, that is, universal ones capable of breaking the laws of worlds. We propose—strategically—to test this premise through translation. And here we must benefit from Badiou's distinction between "being" and "event": philosophical meanings are not found at the level of "being" (which is not merely multiplicities given as quantities or mathematical numbers), but they "exist" following an "event" from which they burst forth in the form of truths unbounded by time. Therefore, the one who translates does not transfer "beings," that is, does not transfer mathematical objects, but helps "truths" to burst forth again. This requires a kind of "faithfulness" to those truths, that is, a "self" suitable for them that was not possible before the "event." Translation is a kind of fidelity to the singular ontologies that emerged from a specific event, and it sees the language in which they emerged only as an appearance. The wager of philosophical translation is not honesty and betrayal, but the ability of the text to enable the "event" to occur again; we mean provoking the text to produce the singular universality it contains in its language, once again, in another language or languages. And translators are producers of singular ontologies, not just carriers of epistemological objects from one language to another. What Badiou proposes is a separation between knowledge and truth when it comes to being in the world. Knowledge is merely a "fixed state" of what we distinguish or differentiate from a "subject," whereas truth is always a kind of "fidelity" that follows a foundational "event." It seems to us that translation is the best method available to contemporary Arabs to test their ability to be faithful to themselves again as "subjects."